

"captive" only by purely semantic indications. We do not sense here the merging of two *differently* oriented speech acts; we do not sense the *integrity and resistance* of the reported message behind the author's transmission.

Finally, to demonstrate what we regard as real quasi-direct discourse, we reproduce below a remarkable specimen from Puškin's *Poltava*. With this we will end this chapter.

But his rage for action Kočubej hid deep within his heart. "His thoughts had now, all weebegone, addressed themselves to death. No ill-will did he bear Mazeppa—his daughter was alone to blame. But he forgave his daughter, too: Let her answer to God, now that she had plunged her family into shame, had Heaven and the laws of man forgot. . ." But meanwhile he scanned his household with an eagle eye, seeking for himself bold, unswerving, incorruptible companions.

V.N. Vrožinov, Marxism and the  
Philosophy of Language, trans. by  
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Titunik (Cambridge: Harvard  
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1929.

## CHAPTER 4

### Quasi-Direct Discourse in French, German, and Russian

*Quasi-direct discourse in French: Tobler; Kalepky; Bally. Criticism of Bally's hypostasizing abstract objectivism. Bally and the Vosslerites. Quasi-direct discourse in German. Eugen Lerch's conception. Lorck's conception. Lorck's theory concerning the role of fantasy in language. Gertraud Lerch's conception. Reported speech in Old French. Reported speech in Middle French. The Renaissance. Quasi-direct discourse in La Fontaine and La Bruyère. Quasi-direct discourse in Flaubert. The emergence of quasi-direct discourse in German. Criticism of the hypostasizing individualistic subjectivism of the Vosslerites.*

Various writers have proposed various nomenclatures for the phenomenon of quasi-direct discourse in French and German. Each of the writers on the subject has, in effect, proposed his or her own term. We have been using and shall continue to use Gertraud Lerch's term, "uneigentliche direkte Rede," [quasi-direct discourse] as the most neutral of all the terms proposed and the one entailing the least amount of theory. As regards Russian and German, the term is beyond reproach; with respect to French, however, its usage may arouse some misgivings.<sup>1</sup>

1. Here are some examples of quasi-direct discourse in French:

1. Il protesta: *Son père la haïssait!*  
In direct discourse that would be:  
Il protesta et s'écria: "*Mon père te hait!*"  
In indirect discourse:  
Il protesta et s'écria que son père la haïssait.  
In quasi-indirect discourse:  
Il protesta: "*son père, s'écria-t-il, la haïssait!*"  
(Example from Balzac as cited by G. Lerch.)

(Continued on next page)

The first mention of quasi-direct discourse as a special form for reporting an utterance, on a par with direct and indirect discourse, was made by Tobler in 1887 (*Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, XI, 437).

Tobler defined quasi-direct discourse as a "peculiar mixture of direct and indirect discourse" [*eigentümliche Mischung direkter und indirekter Rede*]. This mixed form, according to Tobler, derives its *tone* and *word order* from direct discourse and its *verbal tenses* and *persons* from indirect discourse.

As pure description, this definition may be considered acceptable. Indeed, from the superficial viewpoint of the comparative description of features, Tobler has accurately indicated the resemblances and differences between the form in question and direct and indirect discourse.

But the word "mixture" in the definition is completely unacceptable, since it entails a genetic explanation—"formed from a mixture of"—which can hardly be proved. And even in its purely descriptive way, the definition is faulty inasmuch as what we have in quasi-direct discourse is not a simple mechanical mixture or arithmetical sum of two forms but a completely *new*, positive tendency in active reception of another person's utterance, a *special direction* in which the dynamics of the interrelationship between reporting and reported speech moves. But Tobler is deaf to dynamics and registers only the abstract features of patterns.

So much for Tobler's definition. Now, how does he explain the emergence of the form?

A speaker, relating past events, cites another person's utterance in an autonomous form just as it sounded in the past. In the process, the speaker changes the *present* tense of the original utterance to the *imperfect* in order to show that the utterance is contemporaneous with the past events being related. He then makes some additional changes (persons of the verbs and pronouns) so that the utterance not be mistaken for the relator's own.

Tobler's explanation is built on a faulty but old and very widespread linguistic way of arguing: if the speaker had consciously and premeditatedly planned to introduce the new form, what would his reasoning and motivation have been?

(Footnote 1—Continued)

2. Tout le jour, il avait l'oeil au guet; et la nuit, si quelque chat faisait du bruit, le chat prenait l'argent [La Fontaine].

3. En vain il (le colonel) parla de la sauvagerie du pays et de la difficulté pour une femme d'y voyager: elle (Miss Lydia) ne craignait rien; elle aimait par-dessus tout à voyager à cheval; elle se faisait une fête de coucher au bivac; elle menaçait d'aller en Asie Mineure. Bref, elle avait réponse à tout, car jamais Anglaise n'avait été en Corse; donc elle devait y aller [P. Mérimée, *Colomba*].

4. Resté seul dans l'embrasure de la fenêtre, le cardinal s'y tint immobile, un instant encore. . . Et ses bras frémissants se tendirent, en un geste d'implication: "O Dieu! puisque ce médecin s'en allait ainsi, hereux de sauver l'embarras de son impuissance, ô Dieu! que ne faisiez-vous un miracle, pour montrer l'éclat de votre pouvoir sans bornes! Un miracle, un miracle! Il le demandait du fond de son âme de croyant [Zola, *Rome*].

(Examples three and four are cited and discussed by Kalepky, Bally, and Lorck.)

Even if such a way of arriving at explanations were admissible, still, the motives of Tobler's "speaker" are not quite convincing or clear: If he wants to preserve the autonomy of the utterance as it actually sounded in the past, would it not be better to report it in direct discourse? Its belonging to the past and to the reported, not the reporting, addresser would then be beyond any possible doubt. Or, if the *imperfect* and the *third* person are what is at stake, wouldn't it be easier simply to use indirect discourse? The trouble is that what is *basic* to our form—that *entirely new interrelationship between reporting and reported speech which it achieves*—is just exactly what Tobler's motives fail to express. For Tobler, it is simply a matter of two old forms out of which he wants to paste together a new form.

In our opinion, what can at best be explained by this type of argument about speakers' motives is merely the use in one or another concrete instance of an *already available* form, but under no circumstances will it do to explain the composing of a *new* form in language. The individual motives and intentions of a speaker can take meaningful effect only within limits imposed by current grammatical possibilities on the one hand, and within the limits of the conditions of socioverbal intercourse that predominate in his group on the other. These possibilities and these conditions are *given quantities*—they are what circumscribe the speaker's linguistic purview. It is beyond the speaker's individual power to force that purview open.

No matter what the intentions the speaker means to carry out, no matter what errors he may commit, no matter how he analyzes forms or mixes them or combines them, he will not create a new pattern in language and he will not create a new tendency in socioverbal intercourse. His subjective intentions will bear a creative character only to the extent that there is something in them that coincides with tendencies in the socioverbal intercourse of speakers that are in process of formation, of generation; and these tendencies are dependent upon socio-economic factors. Some displacement, some shift had to have occurred within socioverbal intercourse and with regard to the mutual orientation of utterances in order for that essentially new manner of perceiving another person's words, which found expression in the form of quasi-direct discourse, to have been established. As it took shape, this new form began penetrating into that field of linguistic possibilities only within the confines of which can the individual verbal intentions of speakers find definition, motivation, and productive implementation.

The next writer on the subject of quasi-direct discourse was Th. Kalepky (*Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, XIII, 1899, 491-513). He recognized in quasi-direct discourse a completely autonomous third form of reported speech and defined it as *concealed* or *veiled* discourse (*verschleierte Rede*). The stylistic point of the form consisted in the necessity of guessing who the speaker is. And indeed, there is a puzzle: from the standpoint of abstract grammar, it is the

author who speaks; from the standpoint of the actual sense of the whole context, it is a character who speaks.

Kalepky's analysis contains an undoubted step forward in investigation of the question concerning us. Instead of mechanically coupling the abstract features of two patterns, Kalepky attempts to descry the *new*, positive stylistic bearing of the form. In addition, he correctly understood the *double-faced* nature of quasi-direct discourse. However, he incorrectly defined it. Under no conditions can we agree with Kalepky that quasi-direct discourse is "masked" discourse and that the point of the device consists in guessing who the speaker is. No one, after all, starts off the process of understanding with abstract grammatical considerations. Therefore, it is clear to everyone from the very start that, in terms of the *sense* of what is said, it is the character speaking. Difficulties arise only for grammarians. Furthermore, our form does not at all contain an "either/or" dilemma; its *specificum* is precisely a matter of *both* author *and* character speaking at the same time, a matter of a single linguistic construction within which the accents of two differently oriented voices are maintained. We have already seen that the phenomenon of genuinely concealed reported speech does take place in language. We have seen how the insidious effect of another person's speech secreted in the author's context can cause that context to manifest special grammatical and stylistic features. But that is one of the modifications of direct discourse. Quasi-direct discourse, however, is an *overt* type of discourse, notwithstanding the fact that it is double-faced, like Janus.

The chief methodological deficiency in Kalepky's approach is his interpreting a linguistic phenomenon within the framework of the *individual consciousness*, his attempting to discover its psychic roots and subjective-aesthetic effects. We shall return to a fundamental criticism of this approach when we examine the views of the Vosslerites (Lorck, E. Lerch, and G. Lerch).

Bally spoke out on our topic in 1912 (*Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift*, IV, 549 ff, 597 ff). In 1914, in response to Kalepky's polemic, he returned once again to the question with an article on its fundamentals entitled "Figures de pensée et formes linguistiques" (*Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift*, VI, 1914, 405 ff, 456 ff).

The gist of Bally's views amounts to the following: he considers quasi-direct discourse a new, later variant of the classical form of indirect discourse. He traces its formation through the series: *il disait qu'il était malade* > *il disait: il était malade* > *il était malade* (*disait-il*).<sup>2</sup> The dropping of the conjunction *que* is explained, according to Bally, by a more recent tendency inherent in language to prefer paratactic coordination of clauses to hypotactic subordination. Bally points out, furthermore, that this variant of indirect discourse—which he appropriately enough terms *style indirect libre*—is not an inert form but a form in

2. The intermediate (transitional) form is, of course, a linguistic fiction.

motion, moving toward direct discourse as its furthest extreme. In particularly intensive cases, Bally claims, it is sometimes difficult to say where *style indirect libre* leaves off and *style direct* begins. That is how, incidentally, he regards the passage from Zola quoted in our fourth example [see footnote 1, pp. 141-142]. The difficulty arises precisely at the point where the cardinal addresses God: "Ô Dieu! que ne faisiez-vous un miracle!" which apostrophe contains simultaneously a feature of indirect discourse (the imperfect) and the use of the second person as in direct discourse. Bally considers as analogous to French *style indirect libre* that form of German indirect discourse which omits the conjunction and keeps the word order as in direct discourse (the second type in Bally's analysis).

Bally makes a strict distinction between *linguistic forms* ("formes linguistiques") and *figures of thought* ("figures de pensée"). He understands by the latter devices of expression which are illogical from the standpoint of language and in which the normal interrelationship between the linguistic sign and its usual meaning is violated. Figures of thought cannot be acknowledged linguistic phenomena in the strict sense: indeed, there are no specific, stable linguistic features which might express them. On the contrary, the linguistic features involved have a meaning in language which is pointedly other than the meaning imposed upon them by figures of thought. To figures of thought Bally relegates quasi-direct discourse in its pure forms. After all, from a strictly grammatical point of view, it is the author's speech, whereas according to the sense of it, it is the character's speech. But this "sense of it" is not represented by any special linguistic sign. Consequently, what we are dealing with is, according to Bally, an extra-linguistic phenomenon.

Such is Bally's conception in basic outline. He is the linguist who at the present time most outstandingly represents linguistic abstract objectivism. Bally hypostasizes and vivifies forms of language obtained by way of abstraction from concrete speech performances (speech performances in the spheres of practical life, literature, science, etc.). This process of abstraction has been carried out by linguists, as we have already indicated, for purposes of deciphering a dead, alien language and for the practical purposes of teaching it. And now Bally comes along and endows these abstractions with life and momentum: a modification of indirect discourse begins to pursue a course toward the pattern of direct discourse, and on the way quasi-direct discourse is formed. A creative role in the composition of the new form is ascribed to the dropping of the conjunction *que* and the reporting verb. In actual fact, however, the abstract system of language, where Bally's *formes linguistiques* are to be found, is devoid of any movement, any life, any achievement. Life begins only at the point where utterance crosses utterance, i.e., where verbal interaction begins, be it not even "face-to-face" verbal interaction, but the mediated, literary variety.<sup>3</sup>

3. On mediated and unmediated forms of verbal interaction, see the already cited study by L. P. Jakubinskij.

It is not a matter of one abstract form moving toward another, but a matter of the mutual orientation of two utterances changing on the basis of a change in the active perception by the linguistic consciousness of the "speaking personality," of its ideational, ideological autonomy, of its verbal individuality. The dropping of the conjunction *que* brings together, not two abstract forms, but two utterances in all their ideational fullness. The dike ruptures, as it were, and authorial intonations freely stream into the reported speech.

A methodological divorce between linguistic forms and figures of thought, between "langue" and "parole," also results from this kind of hypostasizing objectivism. In point of fact, the linguistic forms Bally has in mind exist only in grammar books and dictionaries (where, to be sure, their existence is perfectly legitimate), but in the living reality of language they are immersed deeply in what, from the abstract grammatical point of view, is the irrational element of "figures de pensée."

Bally is also wrong in taking the German indirect discourse construction of his second type to be analogous to French quasi-direct discourse.<sup>4</sup> It is an extremely symptomatic mistake. Bally's analogy is irreproachable from the standpoint of abstract grammar, but from the standpoint of socioverbal tendency, the comparison cannot hold up under criticism. After all, one and the same social-verbal tendency (dictated by identical socioeconomic conditions) in different languages may, in accordance with the grammatical structures of those languages, appear with different outer features. In any particular language, what begins to undergo modification in a certain specific direction is precisely that pattern which turns out to be the most adaptable in the necessary regard. In French it was the pattern of indirect discourse, in German and Russian—direct discourse.

Let us now turn to an examination of the point of view of the Vosslerites. These linguists shift the dominant in their investigations from grammar to stylistics and psychology, from "language forms" to "figures of thought." Their disagreements with Bally are, as we already know, fundamental and far reaching. Lorck in his criticism of the Geneva linguist contrasts, in Humboldtian terms, Bally's outlook on language as *ergon* with his outlook on language as *energeia*. Thus, the basic premises of individualistic subjectivism are brought directly to bear against Bally's point of view on the particular question at hand. What now enter the lists as factors to explain quasi-direct discourse are: affect in language, fantasy in language, empathy, linguistic taste, and the like.<sup>5</sup>

4. Kalepky pointed out this mistake to Bally, who, in his second study, does partially correct it.

5. Before proceeding to an analysis of the Vosslerites' view, we shall supply three examples of quasi-direct discourse in German:

1. Der Konsul ging, die Hände auf dem Rücken, umher und bewegte nervös die Schultern.

*Er hatte keine Zeit. Er war bei Gott überhäuft. Sie sollte sich gedulden und sich gefälligst noch fünfzig mal besinnen!* [Thomas Mann, *Buddenbrooks*].

Also in 1914—the year of the Kalepky-Bally polemics—Eugen Lerch came forward with his assessment of quasi-direct discourse (*G-r.M.*, VI, 470). His definition of quasi-direct discourse was "speech as fact" (*Rede als Tatsache*). Reported speech is transmitted by this form in such a way as if its content were a fact that the author himself is communicating. Contrasting direct, indirect, and quasi-direct discourse in terms of the degrees of realness inherent in the content of each, Lerch came to the conclusion that the most real of them is quasi-direct discourse. He also evinced a stylistic preference for quasi-direct discourse over indirect discourse in regard to the vividness and concreteness of the impression produced. That is what Lerch's definition amounts to.

A detailed study of quasi-direct discourse was furnished by E. Lorck in 1921 in a small volume under the title *Die "Erlebte Rede."* The book was dedicated to Vossler. In it, Lorck dwells at some length on the history of the issue in question.

Lorck defined quasi-direct discourse as "experienced speech" (*erlebte Rede*) in contradistinction to direct discourse, defined as "repeated speech" (*gesprochene Rede*), and indirect discourse—"communicated speech" (*berichtete Rede*).

Lorck expounds his definition in the following way. Let us suppose Faust on stage speaking his monologue: "Habe nun, ach! Philosophie, Juristerei. . . durchaus studiert mit heissem Bemühen. . ." What the hero utters in the first person, a member of the audience experiences in the third person. And this transposition, occurring in the very depths of the experience of reception, stylistically aligns the experienced discourse with narrative.

Now, if the listener should want to transmit the speech of Faust, which he had heard and experienced, to another, a third person, he will either quote it in direct form or in indirect form. But if he should desire to summon up for himself in his own mind the living impression of the scene experienced, he will recall it as: "Faust hat nun, ach! Philosophie. ." or, inasmuch as it is a case of impressions in the past, "Faust hatte nun, ach! . . ."

Thus, according to Lorck, quasi-direct discourse is a form for the direct depiction of the experiencing of another's speech, a form for summoning up a living

2. *Herrn Gosch ging es schlecht: mit einer schönen und grossen Armbewegung wies er die Annahme zurück, er könne zu den Glücklichen gehören. Das beschwerliche Greisenalter nahte heran, es war da, wie gesagt, seine Grube war geschaufelt. Er konnte abends kaum noch sein Glas Grog zum Munde führen, ohne die Hälfte zu verschütten, so machte der Teufel seinen Arm zittern. Da nützte kein Fluchen. . . Der Wille triumphierte nicht mehr [Ibid.].*

3. *Nun kreutzte Doktor Mantelsack im Stehen die Beine und blätterte in seinem Notizbuch. Hanno Buddenbrook sah vornüber gebeugt und rang unter dem Tisch die Hände. Das B, der Buchstabe B war an der Reihe! Gleich würde sein Name ertönen, und er würde einen Skandal geben, eine laute, schreckliche Katastrophe, so guter Laune der Ordinaris auch sein mochte. . . Die Sekunden dehnten sich martervoll. "Buddenbrook." . . . Jetzt sagte er "Buddenbrook." . . .*

"Edgar" sagte Doktor Mantelsack. . . [Ibid.].

impression of that speech and, on that account, of little use for conveying that speech to a third person. Indeed, if quasi-direct discourse were used for that purpose, the reporting act would lose its communicative character and would make it appear as if the person were talking to himself or hallucinating. Hence, as one would expect, quasi-direct discourse is unusable in conversational language and meant only to serve aims of artistic depiction. There, in its proper function, quasi-direct discourse has enormous stylistic significance.

Indeed, for an artist in process of creation, the figures of his fantasies are the realest of realities; he not only sees them, he hears them, as well. He does not make them speak (as in direct discourse), he hears them speaking. And this living impression of voices heard as if in a dream can be directly expressed only in the form of quasi-direct discourse. It is fantasy's own form. And that explains why it was in the fable world of La Fontaine that the form was first given tongue and why it is the favorite device of such artists as Balzac and especially Flaubert, artists wholly able to immerse and lose themselves in the created world of their own fantasies.

And the artist, when he uses this form, also addresses himself only to the reader's fantasy. It is not his aim to communicate facts or the content of thought with its help; he desires only to convey his impressions directly, to arouse in the reader's mind living figures and representations. He addresses himself not to the reader's intellect, but to his imagination. Only the reasoning and analyzing intellect can take the position that the author is speaking in quasi-direct discourse; for the living fantasy, it is the hero who speaks. Fantasy is the mother of the form.

Lorck's basic idea, an idea he expatiates upon in other works of his,<sup>6</sup> amounts to the point that *the creative role in language belongs not to the intellect but to fantasy*. Only forms that fantasy has already created and that are finished, inert products abandoned by its living spirit come under the command of the intellect. The intellect itself creates nothing.

Language, in Lorck's view, is not ready-made being (*ergon*) but eternal becoming and living occurrence (*energeia*). Language is not a means or an instrument for achieving extralinguistic goals but a living organism with its own goal, which it bears within itself and which it realizes also within itself. And this creative self-sufficiency of language is implemented by linguistic fantasy. In language, fantasy feels itself at home, in its vital native element. Language, for fantasy, is not a means, but flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood. The play of language for the sake of play suffices for fantasy. Writers such as Bally approach language from the angle of the intellect and, therefore, are incapable of understanding those forms which are still alive in language, in which the pulse of becoming still

6. *Passé défini, imparfait, passé indéfini*. Eine grammatischpsychologische Studie von E. Lorck.

beats and which have not yet been transformed into a means for intellectual use. That is why Bally failed to grasp the uniqueness of quasi-direct discourse and, discovering no logical coherence in it, excluded it from language.

Lorck attempts to understand and interpret the form of the imperfect tense in quasi-direct discourse from the point of view of fantasy. He distinguishes "Défini-Denkakte" and "Imparfait-Denkakte." The distinction between these acts runs not along lines of their conceptual content, but along lines of the very form of their effectuation. With the *Défini*, our view projects outward into the world of conceived artifacts and contents; with the *Imparfait* our view plunges inward—into the world of thought in process of generation and formation.

"Défini-Denkakten" bear a character of factual ascertainment; "Imparfait-Denkakten"—that of felt experience, impression. Through them, fantasy itself recreates the living past.

Lorck analyzes the following example:

L'Irlande poussa un grand cri de soulagement, mais la Chambre des lords, six jours plus tard, repoussait le bill: Gladstone tombait [Revue des deux Mondes, 1900, Mai, p. 159].

If, he says, the two cases of the imperfect were to be replaced by the definite past, we would be very sensible of a difference. *Gladstone tombait* is colored in an emotive tone, whereas *Gladstone tomba* would have the sound of a dry businesslike communiqué. In the first case, thought lingers, as it were, over its object and over itself. But what fills the consciousness here is not the idea of Gladstone's fall, but a sense of the momentousness of what has happened. "La Chambre des lords repoussait le bill" is a different matter. Here a sort of anxious suspense about the consequences of the event is established: the imperfect in "repoussait" expresses tense expectation. One need only utter the whole sentence aloud to detect these special features in the psychic orientation of the speaker. The last syllable of "repoussait" is pronounced with high pitch expressing tension and expectation. This tension finds resolution and release, as it were, in "Gladstone tombait." The imperfect in both instances is emotively colored and permeated with fantasy; it does not so much establish the fact of, but rather lingeringly experiences and recreates, the action denoted. Herein consists the significance of the imperfect for quasi-direct discourse. In the atmosphere created by the form, the definite past would have been impossible.

Such is Lorck's conception; he himself calls his analysis investigation in the field of the linguistic psyche (*Sprachseele*). This field ("*das Gebiet der Sprachseelenforschung*") was, according to Lorck, opened up by Karl Vossler. And it was in Vossler's footsteps that Lorck followed in his study.

Lorck examined the question in its static, psychological dimensions. Gertraud Lerch, in an article published in 1922, using the same Vosslerite grounds, endeavors to establish its broad historical perspectives. Her study contains a number



of extremely valuable observations, and we shall, therefore, stop to consider it in some detail.

The role assigned to fantasy in Lorck's conception is played by empathy (*Einfühlung*) in Lerch's. It is empathy that finds adequate expression in quasi-direct discourse. A reporting verb ("said," "thought," and the like) is a prerequisite in direct and indirect discourse. In this way, the author places the responsibility for what is said on his character. Thanks to the fact that such a verb is omitted in quasi-direct discourse, the author is able to present the utterances of his characters in a way suggesting that he himself takes them seriously, and that what is at stake is not merely something that was said or thought, but actual facts. This is possible, Lerch claims, only on the basis of the poet's empathy with the creations of his own fantasy, on the basis of his identifying himself with them.

How did this form come about historically? What were the essential historical features underlying its development?

In Old French, psychological and grammatical constructions were far from being as sharply distinguished as they are now. Paratactic and hypotactic components could still be mixed together in a great many different ways. Punctuation was still in its embryonic stage. Therefore, no clearly marked boundaries between direct discourse and indirect discourse existed then. The Old French storyteller was as yet unable to separate the figures of his fantasy from his own "I." He participated in their words and actions from within, operating as their intercessor and advocate. He had not as yet learned to transmit another person's words in their literal, outward shape, eschewing personal involvement and interference. The Old French temperament still stood far removed from dispassionate, cogitative observation and objective judgment. However, this dissolving of narrator into his characters in Old French was not only the result of the storyteller's free choice, but also came about of necessity: firm logical and syntactic forms for distinct, mutual demarcation were lacking. And so, quasi-direct discourse first appears in Old French on the basis of this grammatical deficiency and not as a free stylistic device. Quasi-direct discourse in this instance is the result of the simple grammatical incapacity of the author to separate his own point of view, his own position, from that of his characters.<sup>7</sup>

7. Here is a curious passage from *Canticle to St. Eulalie* (second half of the 9th century):

Ell'ent adunet lo suon element;  
*melz sostendriet les empedementz*  
*qu'elle perdesse sa Virginitet.*  
 Poros furer morte a grand honestet.

("She gathers her strength: better that she undergo tortures than lose her virginity. Thus she died with great honor.")

Here, Lerch asserts, the saint's staunch, unshakable decision chimes with ("klingt zusammen"), the author's passionate stand on her behalf.

In the Middle French of the late Middle Ages, this immersion of oneself in the minds and feelings of others no longer holds true. In the historical writings of the time, very rarely is the *praesens historicum* encountered, and the standpoint of the narrator is kept distinctly apart from the standpoints of the persons depicted. Emotion gives way to the intellect. Reported speech becomes impersonal and colorless, and the narrator's voice is now heard more distinctly in it than the voice of the reported speaker.

After this depersonalizing period comes the heavily marked individualism of the Renaissance. Reported speech once again endeavors to become intuitive. The storyteller once again tries to align himself with his character, to take a more intimate stand in his regard. Characteristic of Renaissance style is the free, fluctuating, psychologically colored, capricious concatenation of grammatical tenses and moods.

In the 17th century, the linguistic irrationalism of the Renaissance was counteracted by the initiation of firm rules governing tense and mood in indirect discourse (thanks especially to Oudin, 1632). A harmonious balance was established between the objective and subjective sides of thought, between referential analysis and expression of personal attitudes. All this did not come about without pressure on the part of the Academy.

The appearance of quasi-direct discourse as a free, consciously used stylistic device was possible only after a background had been created, thanks to the establishment of *consecutio temporum*, against which it could be distinctly perceived. As such, it first appears in La Fontaine and maintains, in the form in which he used it, an equilibrium between the objective and the subjective, as was characteristic for the age of neoclassicism.

The omission of the reporting verb indicates the identification of the narrator with his character and the use of the imperfect (in contrast to the present tense of direct discourse) and the choice of pronouns appropriate to indirect discourse indicate that the narrator maintains his own independent position, that he does not utterly dissolve into his character's experiences.

The device of quasi-direct discourse, which so neatly surmounted the dualism of abstract analysis and unmediated impression, bringing them into harmonious consonance, proved very suitable for the fabulist La Fontaine. Indirect discourse was too analytical and inert. Direct discourse, though able to recreate another person's utterance dramatically, was incapable of creating, at the same time, a stage for that utterance, a mental and emotional milieu for its perception.

While the device served La Fontaine's purpose of congenial empathizing, La Bruyère was able to extract from it acute satirical effects. He depicted his characters neither in the land of fable nor with mild-mannered humor—he invested quasi-direct discourse with his animosity toward them, his superiority over them. He recoils from the creatures he depicts. All of La Bruyère's figures come out ironically refracted through the medium of his mock objectivism.

In Flaubert's case, the device reveals an even more complex nature. Flaubert unflinchingly fixes his regard upon precisely those things which disgust and repel him. But even then he is able to empathize, to identify himself with the hateful and despicable things he portrays. Quasi-direct discourse in Flaubert becomes just as ambivalent and just as turbulent as his own standpoint vis-à-vis his creations: his inner position oscillates between admiration and revulsion. Quasi-direct discourse, with its capacity for conveying simultaneously identification with and independence, distance from one's creations, was an extremely suitable means for embodying this love-hate relation Flaubert maintained toward his characters.

Such are Gertraud Lerch's interesting deliberations on our topic. To her historical sketch of the development of quasi-direct discourse in French, let us add the information supplied by Eugen Lerch about the time of the appearance of this device in German. Quasi-direct discourse is an extremely late development in German. As a deliberate and full-fledged device, it is used for the first time by Thomas Mann in his novel *Buddenbrooks* (1901), apparently under the direct influence of Zola. This "family epic" is narrated by the writer in emotional tones suggesting one of the unassuming members of the Buddenbrook clan who reminisces about, and in reminiscing vividly reexperiences, the whole history of the family. To this we may add our own remark that in his latest novel, *Der Zauberberg* (1924), Thomas Mann provides us with a still subtler and more profound utilization of the device.

To our knowledge, nothing new and nothing else of any weight has been said on the issue under investigation here. Let us now turn to a critical analysis of the views expressed by Lorck and Lerch.

In the studies of both Lorck and Lerch, a consistent and emphatic individualistic subjectivism is pitted against Bally's hypostasizing objectivism. The individual, subjective critical awareness of speakers underlies the notion of linguistic psyche. Language in all its manifestations becomes expression of individual psychic forces and individual ideational intentions. The generation of language turns out to be the process of generation of mind and soul in individual speakers.

The Vosslerites' individualistic subjectivism in explanation of our concrete phenomenon is just as unacceptable as Bally's abstract objectivism. The fact is, after all, that the speaking personality, its subjective designs and intentions, and its conscious stylistic stratagems do not exist outside their material objectification in language. Without a way of revealing itself in language, be it only in inner speech, personality does not exist either for itself or for others; it can illuminate and take cognizance in itself of only that for which there is objective, illuminating material, the materialized light of consciousness in the form of established words, value judgments, and accents. The inner subjective personality with its own self-awareness does not exist as a material fact, usable as a basis for causal explanation, but it exists as an ideologeme. The inner personality, with all its subjective intentions and all its inner depths, is nothing but an ideologeme—an

ideologeme that is vague and fluid in character until it achieves definition in the more stable and more elaborated products of ideological creativity. Therefore, it is nonsense to try to explain ideological phenomena and forms with the aid of subjective psychic factors and intentions: that would mean explaining an ideologeme of greater clarity and precision with another ideologeme of a vaguer, more muddled character. Language lights up the inner personality and its consciousness; language creates them and endows them with intricacy and profundity—and it does not work the other way. Personality is itself generated through language, not so much, to be sure, in the abstract forms of language, but rather in the ideological themes of language. Personality, from the standpoint of its inner, subjective content, is a theme of language, and this theme undergoes development and variation within the channel of the more stable constructions of language. Consequently, *a word is not an expression of inner personality; rather, inner personality is an expressed or inwardly impelled word.* And the word is an expression of social intercourse, of the social interaction of material personalities, of producers. The conditions of that thoroughly material intercourse are what determine and condition the kind of thematic and structural shape that the inner personality will receive at any given time and in any given environment; the ways in which it will come to self-awareness; the degree of richness and surety this self-awareness will achieve; and how it will motivate and evaluate its actions. The generation of the inner consciousness will depend upon the generative process of language, in terms, of course, of language's grammatical and concrete ideological structure. The inner personality is generated along with language, in the comprehensive and concrete sense of the word, as one of its most important and most profound themes. The generation of language, meanwhile, is a factor in the generative process of social communication, a factor inseparable from that communication and its material base. The material base determines differentiation in a society, its sociopolitical order; it organizes society hierarchically and deploys persons interacting within it. Thereby are the place, time, conditions, forms, and means of verbal communication determined and, by the same token, the vicissitudes of the individual utterance in any given period in the development of language, the degree of its inviolability, the degree of differentiability in perception of its various aspects, the nature of its ideational and verbal individualization. And this finds expression above all in stable constructions of language, in language patterns and their modifications. Here the speaking personality exists not as an amorphous theme but as a more stable construction (to be sure, concretely this theme is inextricably bound up with the specific thematic content appropriate to it). Here, in the forms of reported speech, language itself reacts to personality as the bearer of the word.

But what do the Vosslerites do? They provide explanations that merely put the comparatively stable structural reflection of speaking personality into loose thematic terms that translate events of social generation, events of history, into



the language of individual motivations, extremely subtle and genuine though they may be. They provide an ideology of ideology. However, the objective, material factors in these ideologies—both in forms of language and in the subjective motivations for their usage—remain outside their field of investigation. We do not contend that the endeavor to ideologize ideology is completely worthless. On the contrary, sometimes it is very important to thematize a formal construction in order to gain access to its objective roots—those roots, after all, are common to both aspects. The keen and animated interest in ideology that the idealist Vosslerites have introduced into linguistics does help elucidate certain aspects of language that had turned inert and opaque in the hands of abstract objectivism. And we owe them gratitude for that. They teased and worried the ideological nerve in language when language had at times, in the hands of certain linguists, begun to resemble inanimate nature. However, they did not find their way to a real, objective explanation of language. They came close to the life of history, but not to an explanation of history; they approached the ever-seething, ever-moving surface of history, but not its deep, underlying motive forces. It is symptomatic that Lorck, in a letter to Eugen Lerch that is appended to his book, goes so far as to make the following somewhat surprising statement. After having described the inertness and intellectualist sclerosis of French, he adds the comment: "There is only one possibility for its rejuvenation: the proletariat must take over command of the word from the bourgeoisie (Für sie gibt es nur eine Möglichkeit der Verjüngung: anstelle des Bourgeois muss der Proletarier zu Worte kommen)."

How is this to be connected with the overriding, creative role of fantasy in language? Is a member of the proletariat such a fantasizer, then?

Surely Lorck had something else in mind. He probably means that the proletariat will bring with it new forms of socioverbal intercourse, new forms of verbal interaction of speakers, and a whole new world of social intonations and accents. It will also bring with it a new linguistic truth. Probably that or something like it was what Lorck had in mind when he made his assertion. But there is no reflection of this in his theory. As for fantasizing, a bourgeois is no worse a hand at it than a proletarian, and has more spare time for it, to boot.

Lorck's individualistic subjectivism in application to our concrete question makes itself felt in the incapacity of his conception to reflect the dynamics of the interrelationship between reporting and reported speech. By no means does quasi-direct discourse express a passive impression received from another's utterance. It expresses, instead, an active orientation, and not one that merely amounts to a shift of person from first to third, but one that imposes upon the reported utterance its own accents, which collide and interfere with the accents in the reported utterance. Nor can we agree with Lorck in his contention that quasi-direct discourse is the form of reported speech closest to direct reception and experience of another person's speech. Each form of reported speech perceives

the speech to be reported in its own particular way. Gertraud Lerch seems to have some grasp of the dynamics involved, but she expresses it in terms of subjective psychology. Both writers, therefore, attempt to flatten out a three-dimensional phenomenon, as it were. In the objective linguistic phenomenon of quasi-direct discourse, we have a combination not of empathy and distancing within the confines of an individual psyche, but of the character's accents (empathy) and the author's accents (distancing) within the confines of one and the same linguistic construction.

Both Lorck and Lerch alike fail to take into account one factor of extreme importance for the understanding of our phenomenon: the value judgment inherent in every living word and brought out by the accentuation and expressive intonation of an utterance. Message in speech does not exist outside its living and concrete accentuation and intonation. In quasi-direct discourse, we recognize another person's utterance not so much in terms of its message, abstractly considered, but above all in terms of the reported character's accentuation and intonation, in terms of the evaluative orientation of his speech.

We perceive the author's accents and intonations being interrupted by these value judgments of another person. And that is the way, as we know, in which quasi-direct discourse differs from substituted discourse, where no new accents vis-à-vis the surrounding authorial context appear.

Let us now return to examples of quasi-direct discourse from Russian literature.

Here is a sample of an extremely characteristic type in this regard, again from Puškin's *Poltava*:

Pretending grief, Mazeppa raises loud his humble voice unto the Tsar. "God knows, and all the world can see, he, hapless hetman, twenty years has served the Tsar with loyal heart; bestrewn with boundless favours and most wondrously advanced. . . . What blindness, what folly animosity would be! Is it thinkable that he, who stands upon the threshold to the tomb, would now commence to school himself in treason and becloud his honest name? And did not he indignantly refuse his aid to Stanislaw; appalled, reject the Ukrainian crown and send the Tsar the pact and letters of the plot, as was his duty? Did not he turn a deaf ear unto the blandishments of Khan and Tsargrad Sultan? Aflame with zeal, he gladly plied his mind and sword in contests with the White Tsar's foes, he spared no pains nor life itself, and now a vicious enemy his old grey hairs has covered all in shame. And who? Iskra and Kožubej! Who were so long his friends! . . ." And with bloodthirsty tears, in icy insolence, the villain demands their punishment. . . . Whose punishment? Implacable old man! Whose daughter is in his embrace? But the murmurings of his heart he coldly stills. . . [italics added].

Syntax and style in this passage, on the one hand, are determined by the evaluative tones of Mazeppa's humility and tearful plea and, on the other hand, this "tearful plea" is subjected to the evaluative orientation of the author's context, his narrative accents which, in the given instance, are colored in tones of indignation that eventually erupts in the rhetorical question: "Whose punishment? Implacable old man! Whose daughter is in his embrace?"



It would be entirely possible to recite this passage aloud and convey the double intonation of each of its words, i.e., indignantly reveal the hypocrisy of Mazeppa's plea through the very reading of it. What we have here is a fairly simple case with its rhetorical, somewhat primitive and sharply etched intonations. In most cases, however, and especially in that area where quasi-direct discourse has become a massively used device—the area of modern prose fiction—transmission by voice of evaluative interference would be impossible. Furthermore, the very kind of development quasi-direct discourse has undergone is bound up with the transposition of the larger prose genres into a silent register, i.e., for silent reading. Only this “silencing” of prose could have made possible the multileveledness and voice-defying complexity of intonational structures that are so characteristic for modern literature.

An example of this kind of interference of two speech acts which cannot be conveyed adequately by voice is the following passage from Dostoevskij's *The Idiot*:

And why did he [Prince Myškin] avoid going straight up to him and turn away as if he didn't notice anything, although their eyes had met. (Yes, their eyes had met! And they had looked at one another.) Didn't he himself, after all, want not long ago to take him by the arm and go with him *there*? Didn't he himself, after all, want to go to him tomorrow and say that he had been to see her? Didn't he himself, after all, renounce his demon on his way there, in mid-course, when suddenly joy flooded his soul? Or was there indeed something or other in Rogožin, that is, in *today's* whole image of the man, in the sum total of his words, gestures, behavior, looks, that might justify the prince's terrible forebodings and the infuriating insinuations of his demon? Something or other of the sort that makes itself felt but is difficult to analyze and relate, something impossible to pin down with sufficient reasons. But something nevertheless that produces, despite all the difficulty and the impossibility, a perfectly cogent and irresistible impression that unwittingly turns into the most absolute conviction. Conviction that what? (Oh, how the prince was tormented by the monstrosity, the “baseness” of that conviction, of “that vile foreboding,” and how he reproached himself!).

Let us now devote a few words to a consideration of the very important and interesting problem of the *phonic embodiment of reported speech displayed by the author's context*.

The difficulty of evaluative, expressive intonation consists here in the constant shifting from the evaluative purview of the author to that of the character and back again.

In what cases and to what limits can an author act out his character? The absolute of acting out we understand to be not only a change of expressive intonation—a change equally possible within the confines of a single voice, a single consciousness—but also a change of voice in terms of the whole set of features individualizing that voice, a change of persona (“mask”) in terms of a whole set of individualizing traits of facial expression and gesticulation, and, finally, the com-

plete self-consistency of this voice and persona throughout the entire acting out of the role. After all, into that self-enclosed, individual world there can no longer be any infusion or spillover of the author's intonations. As a result of the self-consistency of the other voice and persona, there is no possibility for gradation in shifting from the author's context to reported speech and from reported speech to author's context. The reported speech will begin to sound as if it were in a play where there is no embracing context and where the character's lines confront other lines by other characters without any grammatical concatenation. Thus relations between reported speech and authorial context, via absolute acting out, take a shape analogous to the relations between alternating lines in dialogue. Thereby the author is put on a level with his character, and their relationship is dialogized. From all this, it necessarily follows that the absolute acting out of reported speech, where a work of fiction is read aloud, is admissible only in the rarest cases. Otherwise an inevitable conflict arises with the basic aesthetic design of the context. It goes without saying that these exceedingly rare cases can involve only linear and moderately picturesque modifications of the direct discourse construction. If the author's retorting remarks intersect the direct discourse or if too dense a shadow from the author's evaluative context falls upon it, absolute acting out is impossible.

However, another possibility is partial acting out (without transformation), which permits making gradual intonational transitions between authorial context and reported speech and, in some cases, given double-faced modifications, permits accommodating all intonations within one voice. To be sure, such a possibility is viable only in cases analogous to the ones we have cited. Rhetorical questions and exclamations often carry out the function of switching from one tone to another.

It remains only for us to sum up our analysis of quasi-direct discourse and, at the same time, to sum up the whole third section of our study. We shall be brief: the substance of the matter is in the argument itself, and we shall refrain from rehashing it.

We have conducted an inquiry into the chief forms of reported speech. We were not concerned with providing abstract grammatical descriptions; we endeavored instead to find in those forms a document of how language at this or that period of its development has perceived the words and personality of another addresser. The point we had in mind throughout was that the vicissitudes of utterance and speaking personality in language reflect the social vicissitudes of verbal interaction, of verbal-ideological communication, in their most vital tendencies.

The word as the ideological phenomenon par excellence exists in continuous generation and change; it sensitively reflects all social shifts and alterations. In the vicissitudes of the word are the vicissitudes of the society of word-users. But the dialectical generation of the word is susceptible of investigation by various

routes. One can study the *generation of ideas*, that is, the history of ideology in the exact sense—the *history of knowledge*, as the history of the generation of truth (since truth is eternal only as eternally generated truth); the *history of literature*, as the generation of artistic veracity. That is one route. Another, intimately connected and in close collaboration with the first, is the study of the *generation of language itself*, as *ideological material*, as the *medium for ideological reflection of existence*, since the reflection of the refraction of existence in the human consciousness comes about only in and through the word. The generation of language cannot be studied, of course, in complete disregard of the social existence refracted in it and of the refracting powers of the socioeconomic conditions. The generation of the word cannot be studied in disregard of the generation of truth and artistic veracity in the word and of the human society for whom that truth and veracity exist. Thus these two routes, in their constant interaction with one another, study the *reflection and refraction of the generation of nature and history in the generation of the word*.

But there is still another route: the *reflection of the social generation of word in word itself*, with its two branches: the *history of the philosophy of the word* and the *history of word in word*. It is precisely in this latter direction that our own study lies. We are perfectly well aware of the shortcomings of our study and can only hope that the very posing of the problem of the word in word has crucial importance. The history of truth, the history of artistic veracity, and the history of language can benefit considerably from a study of the refractions of their basic phenomenon—the *concrete utterance*—in constructions of language itself.

And now a few additional words in conclusion about quasi-direct discourse and the social tendency it expresses.

The emergence and development of quasi-direct discourse must be studied in close association with the development of other picturesque modifications of direct discourse and indirect discourse. We shall then be in a position to see that quasi-direct discourse lies on the main road of development of the modern European languages, that it signalizes some crucial turning point in the social vicissitudes of the utterance. The victory of extreme forms of the picturesque style in reported speech is not, of course, to be explained in terms either of psychological factors or the artist's own individual stylistic purposes, but is explainable in terms of the *general, far-reaching subjectivization of the ideological word-utterance*. No longer is it a monument, nor even a document, of a substantive ideational position; it makes itself felt only as expression of an adventitious, subjective state. Typifying and individualizing coatings of the utterance have reached such an intense degree of differentiation in the linguistic consciousness that they have completely overshadowed and relativized an utterance's ideational core, the responsible social position implemented in it. The utterance has virtually ceased to be an object for serious ideational consideration. The categorical word, the word

“from one's own mouth,” the *declaratory* word remains alive only in scientific writings. In all other fields of verbal-ideological creativity, what predominates is not the “outright” but the “contrived” word. All verbal activity in these cases amounts to piecing together “other persons' words” and “words seemingly from other persons.” Even the humanities have developed a tendency to supplant responsible statements about an issue with a depiction of the issue's contemporary state of affairs, including computation and inductive adducing of “the prevailing point of view at the present time,” which is sometimes even taken as the most solid kind of “solution” to the issue. All this bespeaks an alarming instability and uncertainty of ideological word. Verbal expression in literature, rhetoric, philosophy, and humanistic studies has become the realm of “opinions,” of out and out opinions, and even the paramount feature of these opinions is not *what* actually is “opined” in them but *how*—in what individual or typical way—the “opining” is done. This stage in the vicissitudes of the word in present-day bourgeois Europe and here in the Soviet Union (in our case, up to very recent times) can be characterized as the stage of *transformation of the word into a thing*, the stage of *depression in the thematic value of the word*. The ideologues of this process, both here and in Western Europe, are the formalistic movements in poetics, linguistics, and philosophy of language. One hardly need mention here what the underlying social factors explaining this process are, and one hardly need repeat Lorck's well-founded assertion as to the only ways whereby a revival of the ideological word can come about—the word with its theme intact, the word permeated with confident and categorical social value judgment, the word that really means and takes responsibility for what it says.