DESIRE IN LANGUAGE

A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art

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2. THE BOUNDED TEXT

THE UTTERANCE AS IDEOLOGEME

1. Rather than a discourse, contemporary semiotics takes as its object several semiotic practices which it considers as translinguistic; that is, they operate through and across language, while remaining irreducible to its categories as they are presently assigned.

   In this perspective, the text is defined as a trans-linguistic apparatus that redistributes the order of language by relating communicative speech, which aims to inform directly, to different kinds of anterior or synchronic utterances. The text is therefore a productivity, and this means: first, that its relationship to the language in which it is situated is redistributive (destructive-constructive), and hence can be better approached through logical categories rather than linguistic ones; and second, that it is a permutation of texts, an intertextuality: in the space of a given text, several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralize one another.

2. One of the problems for semiotics is to replace the former, rhetorical division of genres with a typology of texts; that is, to define the specificity of different textual arrangements by placing them within the general text (culture) of which they are part and which is in turn, part of them. The ideologeme is the intersection of a given textual arrangement (a semiotic practice) with the utterances (sequences) that it either assimilates into its own space or to which it refers in the space of exterior texts (semiotic practices). The ideologeme is that intertextual function read as "materialized" at the different structural levels of each text, and which stretches along the entire length of its trajectory, giving it its historical and social coordinates. This is not an interpretative step coming after analysis in order to explain "as ideological" what was first "perceived" as "linguistic." The concept of text as ideologeme determines the very procedure of a semiotics that, by studying the text as intertextuality, considers it as such within (the text of) society and history. The ideologeme of a text is the focus where knowing rationality grasps the transformation of utterances (to which the text is irreducible) into a totality (the text) as well as the insertions of this totality into the historical and social text.

3. The novel, seen as a text, is a semiotic practice in which the synthesized patterns of several utterances can be read.

   For me, the utterance specific to the novel is not a minimal sequence (a definitely set entity). It is an operation, a motion that links, and even more so, constitutes what might be called the arguments of the operation, which, in the study of a written text, are either words or word sequences (sentences, paragraphs) as sememes. Instead of analyzing entities (sememes in themselves), I shall study the function that incorporates them within the text. That function, a dependent variable, is determined along with the independent variables it links together; more simply put, there is univocal correspondence between words or word sequences. It is therefore clear that what I am proposing is an analysis that, while dealing with linguistic units (words, sentences, paragraphs), is of a translinguistic order. Speaking metaphorically, linguistic units (and especially semantic units) will serve only as springboards in establishing different kinds of novelistic utterances as functions. By bracketing the question of semantic sequences, one can bring out the logical practice organizing them, thus proceeding at a suprasegmental level.

   Novelistic utterances, as they pertain to this suprasegmental level, are linked up within the totality of novelistic production. By studying them as such, I shall establish a typology of these utterances and then proceed to investigate, as a second step, their origins outside of the novel. Only in this way can the novel be defined in its unity and/or as ideologeme. To put it another way, the functions defined according to the extra-novelistic textual set (Te) take on value within the novelistic textual set (Tn). The ideologeme of the novel is precisely this intertextual function defined according to Te and having value within Tn.

   Two kinds of analyses, sometimes difficult to distinguish from each other, make it possible to isolate the ideologeme of the sign in the novel:
first, a suprasegmental analysis of the utterances contained within the novel’s framework will reveal it as a bounded text (with its initial programming, its arbitrary ending, its dyadic figuration, its deviations and their concatenation); second, an intertextual analysis of these utterances will reveal the relationship between writing and speech in the text of the novel. I will show that the novel’s textual order is based more on speech than on writing and then proceed to analyze the topology of this “phonetic order” (the arrangement of speech acts in relation to one another).

Since the novel is a text dependent on the ideologeme of the sign, let me first briefly describe the particularities of the sign as ideologeme.

FROM SYMBOL TO SIGN

1. The second half of the Middle Ages (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries) was a period of transition for European culture: thought based on the sign replaced that based on the symbol. A semiotics of the symbol characterized European society until around the thirteenth century, as clearly manifested in this period’s literature and painting. It is, as such, a semiotic practice of cosmogony: these elements (symbols) refer back to one (or several) unrepresentable and unknowable universal transcendence(s); univocal connections link these transcendences to the units evoking them; the symbol does not “resemble” the object it symbolizes; the two spaces (symbolized-symbolizer) are separate and do not communicate.

The symbol assumes the symbolized (universals) as irreducible to the symbolizer (its markings). Mythical thought operates within the sphere of the symbol (as in the epic, folk tales, chansons de geste, et cetera) through symbolic units—units of restriction in relation to the symbolized universals (“heroism,” “courage,” “nobility,” “virtue,” “fear,” “treason,” etc.). The symbol’s function, in its vertical dimension (universals—markings), is thus one of restriction. The symbol’s function in its horizontal dimension (the articulation of signifying units among themselves) is one of escaping paradox; one could even say that the symbol is horizontally antiparadoxical: within its logic, two opposing units are exclusive. The good and the bad are incompatible—as are the

raw and the cooked, honey and ashes, et cetera. The contradiction, once it appears, immediately demands resolution. It is thus concealed, “resolved,” and therefore put aside.

The key to symbolic semiotic practice is given from the very beginning of symbolic discourse: the course of semiotic development is circular since the end is programmed, given in embryo, from the beginning (whose end is the beginning) because the symbol’s function (its ideologeme) antedates the symbolic utterance itself. Thus are implied the general characteristics of a symbolic semiotic practice: the quantitative limitation of symbols, their repetition, limitation, and general nature.

2. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, the symbol was both challenged and weakened, but it did not completely disappear. Rather, during this period, its passage (its assimilation) into the sign was assured. The transcendental unity supporting the symbol—its otherworldly casing, its transmitting focus—was put into question. Thus, until the end of the fifteenth century, theatrical representations of Christ’s life were based on both the canonical and apocryphal Gospels or the Golden legend (see the Mysteries dated c. 1400 published by Achille Jubinal in 1837 and based on the manuscript at the Library of Sainte-Geneviève). Beginning in the fifteenth century, the theater as well as art in general was invaded by scenes devoted to Christ’s public life (as in the Cathedral of Evreux). The transcendental foundation evoked by the symbol seemed to capsize. This heralds a new signifying relation between two elements, both located on the side of the “real” and “concrete.” In thirteenth-century art, for example, the prophets were contrasted with the apostles; whereas in the fifteenth century, the four great evangelists were no longer set against the four prophes; but against the four fathers of the Latin Church (Saint Augustine, Saint Jerome, Saint Ambrose, and Gregory the Great as on the altar of Notre Dame of Avioth). Great architectural and literary compositions were no longer possible: the miniature replaced the cathedral and the fifteenth century became the century of the miniaturists. The serenity of the symbol was replaced by the strained ambivalence of the sign’s connection, which lays claim to resemblance and identification of the elements it holds together, while first postulating their radical difference. Whence the obsessive insistence on the theme of dialogue between two irreducible but similar elements (dialogue—generator of the pathetic and psychological) in this transitional period. For example, the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries abound in dialogues between God and the human soul: the Dialogue of the Crucifix and Pilgrim, Dialogue of the Sinful Soul and Christ, et cetera. Through this movement, the Bible was moralized (see the famous moralized Bible of the Duke of Burgundy's library). It was even replaced by pastiches that bracketed and erased the transcendental basis of the symbol (the Bible of the Poor and the Mirror of Human Salvation).³

3. The sign that was outlined through these mutations retained the fundamental characteristic of the symbol: irreducibility of terms, that is, in the case of the sign, of the referent to the signified, of the signified to the signifier, and, in addition, all the "units" of the signifying structure itself. The ideologeme of the sign is therefore, in a general way, like the ideologeme of the symbol: the sign is dualist, hierarchial, and hierarchizing. A difference between the sign and the symbol can, however, be seen vertically as well as horizontally: within its vertical function, the sign refers back to entities both of lesser scope and more concretized than those of the symbol. They are reified universals become objects in the strongest sense of the word. Put into a relationship within the structure of sign, the entity (phenomenon) under consideration is, at the same time, transcendentalized and elevated to the level of theological unity. The semiotic practice of the sign thus assimilates the metaphysics of the symbol and projects it onto the "immediately perceptible." The "immediately perceptible," valorized in this way, is then transformed into an objectivity—the reigning law of discourse in the civilization of the sign.

Within their horizontal function, the units of the sign's semiotic practice are articulated as a metonymical concatenation of deviations from the norm signifying a progressive creation of metaphors. Oppositional terms, always exclusive, are caught within a network of multiple and always possible deviations (surprises in narrative structures), giving the illusion of an open structure, impossible to finish, with an arbitrary ending. In literary discourse the semiotic practice of the sign first clearly appeared, during the Renaissance, in the adventure novel, which is structured on what is unforeseeable and on surprise as reification (at the level of narrative structure) of the deviation from the norm specific to every practice of the sign. The itinerary of this concatenation of deviations is practically infinite, whence the impression of the work's arbitrary ending.

This is, in fact, the illusory impression which defines all "literature" (all "art"), since such itinerary is programmed by the ideologeme constituting the sign. That is, it is programmed by a closed (finite), dyadic process, which, first, institutes the referent-signified-signifier hierarchy and secondly, interiorizes these oppositional dyads all the way to the very level of the articulation of terms, put together—like the symbol—as resolution of contradiction. In a semiotic practice based on the symbol, contradiction was resolved by exclusive disjunction (nonequivalence) — ≠ — or by nonconjunction — | —; in a semiotic practice based on the sign, contradiction is resolved by nondisjunction — ∨ —.

THE IDEOLOGEME OF THE NOVEL:
NOVELISTIC ENUNCIATION

Every literary work partaking of the semiotic practice of the sign (all "literature" before the epistemological break of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries) is therefore, as ideologeme, closed and terminated in its very beginnings. It is related to conceptualist (antieperimental) thought in the same way as the symbolic is to Platonism. The novel is one of the characteristic manifestations of this ambivalent ideologeme (closure, nondisjunction, linking of deviations)—the sign. Here I will examine this ideologeme in Antoine de La Sale’s Jehan de Saintré.

Antoine de La Sale wrote Jehan de Saintré in 1456, after a long career as page, warrior, and tutor, for educational purposes and as a lament for a departure (for puzzling reasons, and after forty-eight years of service, he left the Kings of Anjou to become tutor of the Count of Saint Pol’s three sons in 1448). Jehan de Saintré is the only novel to be found among La Sale’s writings, which are otherwise presented as compilations of edifying narratives (La Salle, 1448–1451), as “scientifical" tracts, or as accounts of his travels (Lettres à Jacques de Luxembourg sur les tournois, 1459; Réconfort à Madame de Fresne, 1457)—all of these being constructed as historical discourse or as heterogeneous mosaics of texts. Historians of French literature have neglected this particular work—perhaps the first writing in prose that could be called a novel (if one labels as such those works that depend on the ambiguous ideologeme
of the sign). The few studies that have been devoted to it concentrate on its references to the mores of the time, attempt to find the “key” to the characters by identifying them with personalities La Sale might have known, accuse the author of underestimating the historical events of his time (the Hundred Years War, et cetera) as well as of belonging—as a true reactionary—to a world of the past, and so on. Literary history, immersed in referential opacity, has not been able to bring to light the *transitory structure* of this text, which situates it at the threshold of the two eras and shows, through La Sale’s naive poetics, the articulation of this ideologue of the sign, which continues to dominate our intellectual horizon. What is more, Antoine de La Sale’s narrative confirms the narrative of his own writing: La Sale speaks but also, writing, enunciates himself. The story of Jehan de Saintré merges with the book’s story and becomes, in a sense, its rhetorical representation, its other, its inner lining.

1. The text opens with an introduction that shapes (shows) the entire itinerary of the novel: La Sale knows what his text is (“three stories”) and for what reason it exists (a message to Jehan d’Anjou). Having thus uttered his purpose and named its addressee, he marks out within twenty lines the first loop that encloses the textual set and programs it as a means of exchange and, therefore, as sign: this is the loop utterance (exchange object)/addressee (the duke or, simply, the reader). All that remains is to tell, that is, to fill in, to detail, what was already conceptualized, known, before any contact between pen and paper—“the story as word upon word it proceeds.”

2. The title can now be presented: “And first, the story of the Lady of the Beautiful Cousins (of whom I have already spoken) and of Saintré,” which requires a second loop—this one found at the thematic level of the message. La Sale gives a shortened version of Jehan de Saintré’s life from beginning to end (“his passing away from this world,” p. 2). We thus already know how the story will end: the end of the narrative is given before the narrative itself even begins. All anecdotal interest is thus eliminated: the novel will play itself out by rebuilding the distance between life and death; it will be nothing other than an inscription of deviations (surprises) that do not destroy the certainty of the thematic loop (life-death) holding the set together. The text turns on a thematic axis: the interplay between two exclusive oppositions, whose names might change (vice-virtue, love-hate, praise-criticism; for example, the Apology of the widow in the Roman texts is directly followed by the misogynist remarks of Saint Jerome). But the semic axis of these oppositions remains the same (positive-negative); they will alternate according to a trajectory limited by nothing but the initially presupposed excluded middle; that is, the inevitable choice of one or the other term (with the “or” being exclusive).

Within the ideologue of the novel (as with the ideologue of the sign), the irreducibility of opposite terms is admitted only to the extent that the empty space of rupture separating them is provided with ambiguous semic combinations. The initially recognized opposition, setting up the novel’s trajectory, is immediately repressed within a before, only to give way—within a *now*—to a network of paddings, to a concatenation of deviations oscillating between two opposite poles, and, in an attempt at synthesis, resolving within a figure of *dissimulation* or *mask*. Negation is thus repeated in the affirmation of duplicity. The exclusiveness of the two terms posited by the novel’s thematic loop is replaced by a *doubtful positivity* in such a way that the *disjunction* which both opens and closes the novel is replaced by a *yes-no* structure (nondisjunction). This function does not bring about a para-thetic silence, but combines carnivalesque play with its nondiscursive logic; all figures found in the novel (as heir to the carnival) can be read in two ways are organized on the model of this function: ruses, treason, foreigners, androgynes, utterances that can be doubly interpreted or have double destinations (at the level of the novelistic signified), blazonry, “cries” (at the level of the novelistic signifier), and so on. The trajectory of the novel would be impossible without this nondisjunctive function—this *double*—which programs it from its beginning. La Sale first introduces it through the Lady’s doubly oriented utterance: as a message destined to the Lady’s female companions and to the Court, this utterance connotes aggressivity towards Saintré; as a message destined to Saintré himself, it connotes a “tender” and “testing” love. The nondisjunctive function of the Lady’s utterance is revealed in stages that are quite interesting to follow. At first, the message’s duplicity is known only to the speaker herself (the Lady), to the author (subject of the novelistic utterance), and to the reader (addressee of the novelistic utterance). The Court (neutrality = objective opinion), as well as Saintré (passive object of the
message), are dupes of the Lady’s univocal aggressivity towards the page. In the second stage, the duplicity is displaced: Saintré becomes part of it and accepts it; but in the same gesture, he ceases to be the object of a message and becomes the subject of utterances for which he assumes authority. In a third stage, Saintré forgets the nondisjunction; he completely transforms into something positive what he knew to be also negative; he loses sight of the dissimulation and is taken in by the game of a univocal (and therefore erroneous) interpretation of a message that remains double. Saintré’s defeat—and the end of the narrative—are due to this error of substituting an utterance accepted as disjunctive and univocal for the nondisjunctive function of an utterance.

Negation in the novel thus operates according to a double modality: alethic (the opposition of contraries is necessary, possible, contingent, or impossible) and deontic (the reunion of contraries is obligatory, permissible, indifferent, or forbidden). The novel becomes possible when the alethic modality of opposition joins with the deontic modality of reunion. The novel covers the trajectory of deontic synthesis in order to condemn it and to affirm, in the alethic mode, the opposition of contraries. The double (dissimulation, mask), as fundamental figure of the carnival, thus becomes the pivotal springboard for the deviations filling up the silence imposed by the disjunctive function of the novel’s thematic-programmatic loop. In this way, the novel absorbs the duplicity (the dialogism) of the carnivalesque scene while submitting it to the univocity (monologism) of the symbolic disjunction guaranteed by a transcendence—the author—that subsumes the totality of the novelistic utterance.

3. It is, in fact, precisely at this point in the textual trajectory—that is, after the enunciation of the text’s toponymical (message-addresssee) and thematic (life-death) closure (loop)—that the word “actor” is inscribed. It reappears several times, introducing the speech of he who is writing the narrative as being the utterance of a character in this drama of which he is also the author. Playing upon a homophony (Latin: acto, French: acteur-auteur), La Sale touches upon the very point where the speech act (work) tilts towards discursive effect (product), and thus, upon the very constituting process of the “literary” object. For La Sale, the writer is both actor and author; that means that he conceived the text of the novel as both practice (actor) and product (author), process (actor) and effect (author), play (actor) and value (author); and yet, the already set notions of oeuvre (message) and owner (author) do not succeed in pushing the play that preceded them into oblivion. Novelistic speech is thus inserted into the novelistic utterance and accounted for as one of its elements. (I have examined elsewhere the topology of speech acts in the text of the novel.) It unveils the writer as principal actor in the speech play that ensues and, at the same time, binds together two modes of the novelistic utterance, narration and citation, into the single speech of he who is both subject of the book (the author) and object of the spectacle (actor), since, within novelistic nondisjunction, the message is both discourse and representation. The author-actor’s utterance unfolds, divides, and faces in two directions: first, towards a referential utterance, narration—the speech assumed by he who inscribes himself as author-actor; and second, toward textual premises, citation—speech attributed to an other and whose authority he who inscribes himself as author-actor acknowledges. These two orientations intertwine in such a way as to merge. For example, La Sale easily shifts from the story as “lived” by the Lady of the Beautiful Cousins (to which he is witness, i.e., witness to the narration) to the story of Aeneas and Dido as read (cited), and so on.

4. In conclusion, let me say that the modality of novelistic enunciation is inferential: it is a process within which the subject of the novelistic utterance affirms a sequence, as conclusion of the inference, based on other sequences (referential—hence narrative, or textual—hence citational), which are the premises of the inference and, as such, considered to be true. The novelistic inference is exhausted through the naming process of the two premises and, particularly, through their concatenation, without leading to the syllogistic conclusion proper to logical inference. The function of the author/actor’s enunciation therefore consists in binding his discourse to his readings, his speech act to that of others.

The words that mediate this inference are worth noting: “it seems to me at first view that she wished to imitate the widows of ancient times...” “if, as Vergil says...” “and thereupon Saint Jerome says...” and so on. These are empty words whose functions are both conjunctive and translative. As conjunctive, they tie together (totalize) two minimal utterances (narrative and citational) within the global, novelistic utterance. They are
therefore internuclear. As translative, they transfer an utterance from one textual space (vocal discourse) into another (the book), changing its ideologeme. They are thus intranuclear (for example, the transposition of hawkers' cries and blazons into a written text).

These inferential agents imply the juxtaposition of a discourse invested in a subject with another utterance different from the author's. They make possible the deviation of the novelistic utterance from its subject and its self-presence, that is, its displacement from a discursive (informational, communicative) level to a textual level (of productivity). Through this inferential gesture, the author refuses to be an objective “witness”—possessor of a truth he symbolizes by the word—in order to inscribe himself as reader or listener, structuring his text through and across a permutation of other utterances. He does not so much speak as decipher. The inferential agents allow him to bring a referential utterance (narration) back to textual premises (citations) and vice versa. They establish a similitude, a resemblance, an equalization of two different discourses. The ideologeme of the sign once again crops up here, at the level of the novelistic enunciation's inferential mode: it admits the existence of an other (discourse) only to the extent that it makes it its own. This splitting of the mode of enunciation did not exist in the epic: in the chansons de geste, the speaker's utterance is univocal; it names a referent (“real” object or discourse); it is a signifier symbolizing transcendent objects (universals). Medieval literature, dominated by the symbol, is thus a “signifying,” “phonetic” literature, supported by the monolithic presence of signified transcendence. The scene of the carnival introduces the split speech act: the actor and the crowd are each in turn simultaneously subject and addressee of discourse. The carnival is also the bridge between the two split occurrences as well as the place where each of the terms is acknowledged: the author (actor + spectator). It is this third mode that the novelistic inference adopts and effects within the author's utterance. As irreducible to any of the premises constituting the inference, the mode of novelistic enunciation is the invisible focus where the phonetic (referential utterance, narration) and written (textual premises, citation) intersect. It is the hollow, unrepresentable space signaled by “as,” “it seems to me,” “says thereupon,” or other inferential agents that refer back, tie together, or bind. We thus uncover a third programming of the novelistic text which brings it to a close before the beginning of the actual story: novelistic enunciation turns out to be a nonsyllogistic inference, a compromise between testimony and citation, between the voice and the book. The novel will be performed within this empty space, within this unrepresentable trajectory bringing together two types of utterances with their different and irreducible “subjects.”

THE NONDISJUNCTIVE FUNCTION OF THE NOVEL

1. The novelistic utterance conceives of the opposition of terms as a nonalternating and absolute opposition between two groupings that are competitive but never solidary, never complementary, and never reconcilable through indestructible rhythm. In order for this nonalternating disjunction to give rise to the discursive trajectory of the novel, it must be embodied within a negative function: nondisjunction. It is this nondisjunctive function that intervenes on a secondary level and instead of an infinity complementary to bipartition (which could have taken shape within another conception of negation one might term radical, and this presupposes that the opposition of terms is, at the same time, thought of as communion or symmetrical reunion) it introduces the figure of dissimulation, of ambivalence, of the double. The initial nonalternating opposition thus turns out to be a pseudo-opposition—and this at the time of its very inception, since it doesn't integrate its own opposition, namely, the solidarity of rivals. Life is opposed to death in an absolute way (as is love to hate, virtue to vice, good to bad, being to nothingness) without the opposition's complementary negation that would transform bipartition into rhythmic totality. The negation remains incomplete and unfinished unless it includes this doubly negative movement that reduces the difference between two terms to a radical disjunction with permutation of those terms; that is, to an empty space around which they move, dying out as entities and turning into an alternating rhythm. By positing two opposing terms without affirming their identity in the same gesture and simultaneously, such a negation splits the movement of radical negation into two phases: disjunction and nondisjunction.

2. This division introduces, first of all, time: temporality (history) is the spacing of this splitting negation, i.e., what is introduced between two isolated and nonalternating scansion (opposition-coinciliation). In other
cultures, it has been possible to develop an irrevocable negation that ties
the two scansion into an equalization, thus avoiding the spacing of the
negative process (duration) and substituting in its place an emptiness
(space) that produces the permutation of contraries.

Rendering negation ambiguous brings about, in the same way, a
finality, a theological principle (God, "meaning"). To the extent that dis-
junction is recognized as an initial phase, there imposes itself at a second
stage a synthesis of the two into one, presented as a unification that
"forgets" opposition in the same way that the opposition did not
"assume" unification. If God appears at the second stage to mark the
bounding of a semiotic practice organized according to nonalternating
negation, it is obvious that this closure is already present at the first stage
of the simple, absolute opposition (nonalternating opposition).

It is within this split negation that all mimesis is born. Nonalternating
negation is the law of narrative: every narration is made up, nourished by
time, finality, history, and God. Both epic and narrative prose take
place within this space and move toward the theology produced by
nonalternating negation. We would have to look to other civilizations to
find a nonmimetic discourse—whether scientific or sacred, moral or
ritual—constructed through a process of deletion by rhythmic sequences,
enclosing antithetical semic couplings within an orchestrated move-
ment. The novel is no exception to that narrative law. It is a particular
case within the plurality of narratives where the nondisjunctive function
is concretized at all levels (thematic, syntagmatic, actants, et cetera) of
the entire novelistic utterance. It is precisely the second stage of non-
alternating negation—that is, nondisjunction—that determines the
ideologeme of the novel.

3. Indeed, disjunction (the thematic loops: life-death, love-hate,
fidelity-treason) frames the novel, as was found to be the case in the
bounded structures programming the novel’s beginning. But the novel is
not possible unless the disjunction between two terms can be denied while
all the time being there, confirmed, and approved. It is presented, now,
as double rather than as two irreducible elements. The figures of traitor,
scorned-at sovereign, vanquished warrior, and unfaithful woman stem
from this nondisjunctive function found at the novel’s origin.

The epic, on the other hand, was organized according to the symbolic
function of exclusive disjunction or nondisjunction. In the Song of

Roland and the Round Table Cycles, hero and traitor, good and evil,
duty and love, pursue one another in irreconcilable hostility from begin-
ing to end, without any possibility of compromise. The “classical” epic,
by obeying the law of nonconjunction (symbolic), can therefore engender
neither personalities nor psychologies. Psychology will appear along
with the nondisjunctive function of the sign, finding in its ambiguity a
terrain conducive to its meanderings. It would be possible, however, to
trace the appearance of the double as precursor to the conception of per-
sonality within the evolution of the epic. Near the end of the twelfth
century—and especially in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries—there
spreads an ambiguous epic: emperors are ridiculed, religion and barons
become grotesque, heroes are cowardly and suspect (“Charlemagne’s Pil-
grimage”); the king is worthless, virtue is no longer rewarded (the Garin
de Monglan Cycle) and the traitor becomes a principal actant (the Doon
of Mayence Cycle or the “Racoul de Cambrai” poem). Neither satirical,
laudatory, stigmatizing, nor approving, this epic is witness to a dual
semiotic practice, founded on the resemblance of contraries, feeding on
miscellany and ambiguity.

4. The courtly literature of Southern France is of particular interest
within this transition from symbol to sign. Recent studies have
demonstrated the analogies between the cult of the Lady in these texts
and those of ancient Chinese poetry. There would be evidence showing
influence of a hieroglyphic semiotic practice based on “conjunctive dis-
junction” (dialectical negation) upon a semiotic practice based on non-
disjunctive opposition (Christianity, Europe). Such hieroglyphic semiotic
practice is also and above all a conjunctive disjunction of the two sexes as
irreducibly differentiated and, at the same time, alike. This explains why,
over a long period, a major semiotic practice of Western society (courtly
poetry) attributed to the Other (Woman) a primary structural role. In
our civilization—caught in the passage from the symbol to the
sign—hymn to conjunctive disjunction was transformed into an apology
for only one of the opposing terms: the Other (Woman), within which is
projected and with which is later fused the Same (the Author, Man). At
the same time there was produced an exclusion of the Other, inevitably
presented as an exclusion of woman, as nonrecognition of sexual (and
social) opposition. The rhythmic order of Oriental texts organizing the
sexes (differences) within conjunctive disjunction (hierogamy) is here
replaced by a centered system (Other, Woman) whose center is there only so as to permit those making up the Same to identify with it. It is therefore a pseudo-center, a mystifying center, a blind spot whose value is invested in the Same giving the Other (the center) to itself in order to live as one, alone, and unique. Hence, the exclusive positivity of this blind center (Woman), stretching out to infinity (of “nobility” and “qualities of the heart”), erasing disjunction (sexual difference), and dissolving into a series of images (from the angel to the Virgin). The unfinished negative gesture is, therefore, already theological: it is stopped before having designated the Other (Woman) as being at the same time opposed and equal to the Same (Man, Author), before being denied through the correlation of contraries (the identity of Man and Woman simultaneous to their disjunction). It eventually identified with religious attitudes, and in its incompleteness it evokes Platonism.

Scholars have interpreted the theologization of courtly literature as an attempt to save love poetry from the persecutions of the Inquisition; or, on the contrary, as evidence of the infiltration in Southern French society of the Inquisition Tribunals' activity, or that of the Dominican and Franciscan orders, after the debacle of the Albigenses. Whatever the empirical facts may be, the spiritualization of courtly literature was already given within the structure of this semiotic practice characterized by pseudo-negation as well as nonrecognition of the conjunctive disjunction of semantic terms. Within such an ideologeme, the idealization of woman (of the Other) signifies the refusal of a society to constitute itself through the recognition of the differential but nonhierarchizing status of opposed groups. It also signifies the structural necessity for this society to give itself a permutative center, an Other entity, which has no value except as an object of exchange among members of the Same. Sociology has described how women came to occupy this permutational center (as object of exchange). This devalorizing valorization prepared the terrain for, and cannot be fundamentally distinguished from, the explicit devalorization of women beginning with fourteenth-century bourgeois literature (in fabliaux, soties, and farces).

5. Antoine de La Sale's novel, situated halfway between these two types of utterances, contains both: the Lady is a dual figure within the novel's structure. She is no longer only the deified mistress required by the code of courtly poetry, that is, the valorized term of a nondisjunctive connection. She is also disloyal, ungrateful, and infamous. In Jehan de Saintré, the two attributive terms are no longer semantically opposed through nonconjunction as would be required in a semiotic practice dependent on the symbol (the courtly utterance); rather, they are nondisjunctive within a single ambivalent unity connoting the ideologeme of the sign. Neither deified nor ridiculed, neither mother nor mistress, neither enamored of Saintré nor faithful to the Abbot, the Lady becomes the nondisjunctive figure par excellence in which the novel is centered.

Saintré is also part of this nondisjunctive function: he is both child and warrior, page and hero, the Lady's fool and conqueror of soldiers, cared for and betrayed, lover of the Lady and loved either by the king or a comrade in arms—Boucicaut (p. 141). Never masculine, child-lover for the Lady or comrade-friend sharing a bed with the king or Boucicaut, Saintré is the accomplished androgyne; the sublimation of sex (without sexualization of the sublime). His homosexuality is merely the narrativization of the nondisjunctive function peculiar to the semiotic process of which he is a part. He is the pivot-mirror within which the other arguments of the novelistic function are projected in order to fuse with themselves: the Other is the Same for the Lady (the man is the child, and therefore the woman herself finds there her self-identity nondisjoined from the Other, while remaining opaque to the irreducible difference between the two). He is the Same who is also the Other for the king, the warriors, or Boucicaut (as the man who is also the woman who possesses him). The Lady's nondisjunctive function, to which Saintré is assimilated, assures her a role as object of exchange in male society. Saintré's own nondisjunctive function assures him a role as object of exchange between the masculine and feminine of society; together, they tie up the elements of a cultural text into a stable system dominated by nondisjunction (the sign).

THE AGREEMENT OF DEVIATIONS

The novel's nondisjunctive function is manifested, at the level of the concatenation of its constituent utterances, as an agreement of deviations: the two originally opposed arguments (forming the thematic loops life-
death, good-evil, beginning-end, etc.) are connected and mediated by a series of utterances whose relation to the originally posited opposition is neither explicit nor logically necessary. They are concatenated without any major imperative putting an end to their juxtaposition. These utterances, as deviations in relation to the oppositional loop framing the novelistic utterance, are laudatory descriptions of either objects (clothes, gifts, and weapons) or events (the departures of troops, banquets, and combats); such are the descriptions of commerce, purchases, and apparel (pp. 51, 63, 71-72, 79) or of weapons (p. 50), etc. These kinds of utterances reappear with obligatory monotonity and make of the text an aggregate of recurrences, a succession of closed, cyclical utterances, complete in themselves. Each one is centered in a certain point, which can connote space (the tradesman’s shop, the Lady’s chamber), time (the troops’ departure, Saintré’s return), the subject of enunciation, or all three at once. These descriptive utterances are minutely detailed and return periodically according to a repetitive rhythm placing its grid upon the novel’s temporality. Indeed, La Sale does not describe events evolving over a period of time. Whenever an utterance assumed by an Actor (Author) intervenes to serve as a temporary connecting device, it is extremely laconic and does nothing more than link together descriptions that first place the reader before an army ready to depart, a shopkeeper’s place, a costume or piece of jewelry and then proceed to praise these objects put together according to no causality whatsoever. The imbrications of these deviations are apt to open up—praises could be repeated indefinitely. They are, however, terminated (bounded and determined) by the fundamental function of the novelistic utterance: nondisjunction. Caught up within the novel’s totality—that is, seen in reverse, from the end of the novel where exaltation has been transformed into its contrary (desolation) before ending in death—these laudatory descriptions become relativized, ambiguous, deceptive, and double: their univocity changes to duplicity.

2. Besides laudatory descriptions, another kind of deviation operating according to nondisjunction appears along the novel’s trajectory: Latin citations and moral precepts. Examples include Thales of Miletus, Socrates, Timides, Pittacus of Misselene, the Gospels, Cato, Seneca, Saint Augustine, Epicurus, Saint Bernard, Saint Gregory, Saint Paul, Avicenna, etc.; in addition to acknowledged borrowings, a considerable number of plagiarisms have also been pointed out.

It is not difficult to find the extranovelistic sources of these two kinds of deviations: the laudative description and the citation.

The first comes from the fair, marketplace, or public square. It is the utterance of the merchant vaunting his wares or of the herald announcing combat. Phonetic speech, oral utterance, sound itself, become text; less than writing, the novel is thus the transcription of vocal communication. An arbitrary signifier (the word as phone) is transcribed onto paper and presented as adequate to its signified and referent. It represents a “reality” that is already there, preexistent to the signifier, duplicated so as to be integrated into the circuit of exchange; it is therefore reduced to a representamen (sign) that is manageable and can be circulated as an element assuring the cohesion of a communicative (commercial) structure endowed with meaning (value).

These laudatory utterances, known as blazons, were abundant in France during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. They come from a communicative discourse, shouted in public squares, and designed to give direct information to the crowd on wars (the number of soldiers, their direction, armaments, etc.), or on the marketplace (the quality and price of merchandise). These solemn, tumultuous, or monumental enumerations belong to a culture that might be called phonetic. The culture of exchange, definitively imposed by the European Renaissance, is engendered through the voice and operates according to the structures of the discursive (verbal, phonetic) circuit, inevitably referring back to a reality with which it identified by duplicating it (by “signifying it”). “Phonetic” literature is characterized by this kind of laudatory and repetitive utterances-enumetations.

The blazon later lost its univocity and became ambiguous; praise and blame at the same time. In the fifteenth century, the blazon was already the nondisjunctive figure par excellence.

Antoine de La Sale’s text captures the blazon just before this splitting into praise and/or blame. Blazons are recorded into the book as univocally laudatory. But they become ambiguous as soon as they are read from the point of view of the novelistic text’s general function: the Lady’s treachery skewers the laudatory tone and shows its ambiguity. The blazon is transformed into blame and is thus inserted into the novel’s nondisjunctive function as noted above: the function established according to the extratextual (Te) changes within the novelistic textual set (Tn) and in this way defines it as ideologeme.
This splitting of the utterance’s univocity is a typically oral phenomenon which can be found within the entire discursive (phonetic) space of the Middle Ages and especially in the carnival scene. The splitting that makes up the very nature of the sign (object/sound, referent/signified/signifier) as well as the topology of the communicative circuit (subject-addressee, Same-pseudo Other), reaches the utterance’s logical level (phonetic) and is presented as nondisjunctive.

3. The second kind of deviation—the citation—comes from a written text. Latin as well as other books (already read) penetrate the novel’s text either as directly copied (citations) or as mnemonic traces (memories). They are carried intact from their own space into the space of the novel being written; they are transcribed within quotation marks or are plagiarized.54

While emphasizing the phonetic and introducing into the cultural text the (bourgeois) space of the fair, marketplace, and street, the end of the Middle Ages was also characterized by a massive infiltration of the written text: the book ceased to be the privilege of nobles or scholars and was democratized.55 As a result, phonetic culture claimed to be a scriptural one. To the extent that every book in our civilization is a transcription of oral speech,56 citation and plagiarism are as phonetic as the blazon even if their extrascriptural (verbal) source goes back to a few books before Antoine de La Sale’s.

4. Nevertheless, the reference to a written text upsets the laws imposed on the text by oral transcription: enumeration, repetition, and therefore temporality (cf. supra). The introduction of writing has two major consequences.

First, the temporality of La Sale’s text is less a discursive temporality (the narrative sequences are not ordered according to the temporal laws of the verb phrase) than what we might call a scriptural temporality (the narrative sequences are oriented towards and rekindled by the very activity of writing). The succession of “events” (descriptive utterances or citations) obeys the motion of the hand working on the empty page—the very economy of inscription. La Sale often interrupts the course of discursive time to introduce the present time of his work on the text: “To return to my point,” “to put it briefly,” “as I will tell you,” and “here I will stop speaking for a bit of Madame and her Ladies to return to little Saintré,” etc. Such junctives signal a temporality other than that of the discursive (linear) chain: the massive present of inferential enunciation (of the scriptural work).

Second, the (phonetic) utterance having been transcribed onto paper and the foreign text (citation) having been copied down, both of them form a written text within which the very act of writing shifts to the background and appears, in its totality, as secondary: as a transcription-copy, as a sign, as a “letter,” no longer in the sense of inscription but of exchange object (“which I send to you in the manner of a letter”).

The novel is thus structured as dual space: it is both phonetic utterance and scriptural level, overwhelmingly dominated by discursive (phonetic) order.

ARBITRARY COMPLETION AND STRUCTURAL FINITUDE

1. All ideological activity appears in the form of utterances compositionally completed. This completion is to be distinguished from the structural finitude to which only a few philosophical systems (Hegel) as well as religions have aspired. The structural finitude characterizes, as a fundamental trait, the object that our culture consumes as a finished product (effect, impression) while refusing to read the process of its productivity: “literature”—within which the novel occupies a privileged position. The notion of literature coincides with the notion of the novel, as much on account of chronological origins as of structural bounding.57

Explicit completion is often lacking, ambiguous, or assumed in the text of the novel. This incompleteness nevertheless underlines the text’s structural finitude. Every genre having its own particular structural finitude, I shall try to isolate that of Jehan de Saintré.

2. The initial programming of the book is already its structural finitude. Within the figures described above, the trajectories close upon themselves, return to their point of departure or are confirmed by a censoring element in such a way as to outline the limits of a closed discourse. The book’s compositional completion nevertheless reworks the structural finitude. The novel ends with the utterance of the author who, after having brought the story of his character, Saintré, to the point of the Lady’s punishment, interrupts the narrative to announce the end: “And here I shall begin the end of this story . . . ” (p. 307).

The story can be considered finished as soon as there is completion of one of the loops (resolution of one of the oppositional dyads) the series of
which was opened by the initial programming. This loop is the condemnation of the Lady, signifying a condemnation of ambiguity. The narrative stops there. I shall call this completion of the narrative by a concrete loop a reworking of the structural finitude.

But the structural finitude, once more manifested by a concretization of the text's fundamental figure (the oppositional dyad and its relation to nondissolution) is not sufficient for the bounding of the author's discourse. Nothing in speech can put an end—except arbitrarily—to the infinite concatenation of loops. The real arresting act is performed by the appearance, within the novelistic utterance, of the very work that produces it, here, on the actual page. Speech ends when its subject dies and it is the act of writing (of work) that produces this murder.

A new rubric, the "actor," signals the second—the actual—reworking of the ending: "And here I shall give an ending to the book of the most valiant knight who..." (p. 308). A brief narrative of the narrative follows, terminating the novel by bringing the utterance back to the act of writing "Now, most high, and most powerful and excellent prince and my most feared lord, if I have erred in any way either by writing too much or too little [... ] I have made this book, said Saintre, which I send to you in the manner of a letter"—p. 309, emphasis mine) and by substituting the present of script for the past of speech ("And in conclusion, for the present, my most feared lord, I write you nothing else" [p. 309]—emphasis mine).

Within this dual surface of the text (story of Saintre—story of the writing process)—the scriptural activity having been narrated and the narrative having been often interrupted to allow the act of production to surface—(Saintre's) death as rhetorical image coincides with the stopping of discourse (erasure of the actor). Nevertheless—as another retraction of speech—this death, repeated by the text at the moment it becomes silent, cannot be spoken. It is asserted by a (tomblike) writing, which writing (as text of the novel) places in quotation marks. In addition—another retraction, this time of the place of language—this citation of the tombstone inscription is produced in a dead language (Latin). Set back in relation to French, the Latin reaches a standstill where it is no longer the narrative that is being completed (having been terminated in the preceding paragraph: "And here I shall begin the end of this story...") but rather the discourse and its product—"literature"/the "letter" ("And here I shall give an ending to the book...").

3. The narrative could again take up Saintre's adventures or spare us several of them. The fact remains nevertheless that it is bounded, born dead: what terminates it structurally are the bounded functions of the sign's ideologeme, which the narrative repeats with variation. What bounds it compositionally and as cultural artifact is the expliciting of the narrative as a written text.

Thus, at the close of the Middle Ages and therefore before consolidation of "literary" ideology and the society of which it is the superstructure, Antoine de La Sale doubly terminated his novel: as narrative (structurally) and as discourse (compositionally). This compositional closure, by its very naivete, reveals a major fact later occulted by bourgeois literature.

The novel has a double semiotic status: it is a linguistic (narrative) phenomenon as well as a discursive circuit (letter, literature). The fact that it is a narrative is but one aspect—an anterior one—of this particularity: it is "literature." That is the difference characterizing the novel in relation to narrative: the novel is already "literature"; that is, a product of speech, a (discursive) object of exchange with an owner (author), value, and consumer (the public, addressee). The narrative's conclusion coincides with the conclusion of one loop's trajectory. The novel's finitude, however, does not stop at this conclusion. An instance of speech, often in the form of an epilogue, occurs at the end to slow down the narration and to demonstrate that one is indeed dealing with a verbal construction under the control of a subject who speaks. The narrative is presented as a story, the novel as a discourse (independent of the fact that the author—more or less consciously—recognizes it as such). In this, it constitutes a decisive stage in the development of the speaking subject's critical consciousness in relation to his speech.

To terminate the novel as narrative is a rhetorical problem consisting of reworking the bounded ideologeme of the sign which opened it. To complete the novel as literary artifact (to understand it as discourse or sign) is a problem of social practice, of cultural text, and it consists in confronting speech (the product, the Work) with its own death—writing (textual productivity). It is here that there intervenes a third conception of the book as work and no longer as a phenomenon (narrative) or as literature (discourse). La Sale, of course, never reaches this stage. The succeeding social text eliminates all notions of production from its scene in order to substitute a product (effect, value): the reign of literature is
the reign of market value occulting even what La Sale practiced in a confused way: the discursive origins of the literary event. We shall have to wait for a reevaluation of the bourgeois social text in order for a reevaluation of "literature" (of discourse) to take place through the advent of scriptural work within the text. 29

4. In the meantime, this function of writing as work destroying literary representation (the literary artifact) remains latent, misunderstood, and unspoken, although often at work in the text and made evident when deciphered. For La Sale, as well as for any so-called "realist" writer, writing is speech as law (with no possible transgression. Writing is revealed, for him who thinks of himself as "author," as a function that ossifies, petrifies, and blocks. For the phonetic consciousness—from the Renaissance to our time 30—writing is an artificial limit, an arbitrary law, a subjective finitude. The intervention of writing in the text is often an excuse used by the author to justify the arbitrary ending of his narrative. Thus, La Sale inscribes himself as writing in order to justify the end of his writing: his narrative is a letter whose death coincides with the end of his pen work. Inversely, Saintré's death is not the narration of an adventure: La Sale, often verbose and repetitive, restricts himself, in announcing this major fact, to the transcription from a tomb in two languages—Latin and French.

There we have a paradoxical phenomenon that dominates, in different forms, the entire history of the novel: the devalorization of writing, its categorization as pejorative, paralyzing, and deadly. This phenomenon is on a par with its other aspect: valorization of the oeuvre, the Author, and the literary artifact (discourse). Writing itself appears only to bound the book, that is, discourse. What opens it is speech: "of which the first shall tell of the Lady of the Beautiful Cousins." The act of writing is the differential act par excellence, reserving for the text the status of other, irreducible to what is different from it; it is also the correlational act par excellence, avoiding any bounding of sequences within a finite ideology, and opening them up to an infinite arrangement. Writing, however, has been suppressed, evoked only to oppose "objective reality" (utterance, phonetic discourse) to a "subjective artifice" (scriptural practice). The opposition phonetic/scriptural, utterance/text—at work within the bourgeois novel with devalorization of the second term (of the scriptural, textual)—misd the Russian Formalists. It permitted them to interpret the insertion of writing into narrative as proof of the text's "arbitrariness" or of the work's so-called "literariness." It is evident that the concepts of "arbitrariness" or "literariness" can only be accepted within an ideology of valorization of the oeuvre (as phonetic, discursive) to the detriment of writing (textual productivity); in other words, only within a bounded (cultural) text.

1966–1967

Notes

1. When considering semiotic practices in relation to the sign, one can distinguish three types: first, a systematic semiotic practice founded on the sign, therefore on meaning; conservative and limited, its elements are oriented toward denotata; it is logical, explicative, interchangeable, and not at all destined to transform the other (the addressee). Second, a transformative semiotic practice, in which the "signs" are released from denotata and oriented toward the other, whom they modify. Third, a paragrammatic semiotic practice, in which the sign is eliminated by the correlative paragrammatic sequence, which could be seen as a tetralemma—each sign has a denotatum; each sign does not have a denotatum; each sign has and does not have a denotatum; it is not true that each sign has and does not have a denotatum. See my "Pour une séméiologie des paragrammes," in Sémiotique: recherches pour une sémiélyse (Paris: Seuil, 1969), pp. 196ff.

2. "Literary scholarship is one branch of the study of ideologies which...embraces all areas of man's ideological creativity," P. N. Medvedev and M. Bakhtin, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics, Albert J. Wehrli, trans. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 3. I have borrowed the term "séméiologie" from this work.

3. I use the term "sémeme" as it appears in the terminology of A. J. Greimas, who defines it as a combination of the semic nucleus and contextual series. He considers it as belonging to the level of manifestation, as opposed to the level of immanence, which is that of the sense. See A. J. Greimas, Sémantiquestructurale (Paris: Larousse, 1966), p. 42.

4. Within Western scientific thinking, three fundamental currents break away from the symbol's domination, one after another, moving through the sign to the variable. These three are Platonism, conceptualism, and nominalism. See V. Willard Quine, "Reification of Universals," in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953). I have borrowed from this study the differentiation between two meanings of signifying units: one within the space of the symbol, the other within that of the sign.


Psychological states seem to be "free of personalities. Consequently, they are free to change with extraordinary rapidity and to attain unbelievable dimensions. Man may be transformed from good to bad, changes in his psychological state happening in a flash." D. S. Lichachev, "Chelovek v literaturu drevnej Rusi" [Man in the Literature of Old Russia] (Moscow-Leningrad 1958), p. 81.

16. See Alois Richard Nykl, Hispano-Arabic Poetry and Its Relations with the Old Provençal Troubadours (Baltimore: J. H. Furst, 1946). This study demonstrates how, without mechanically "influencing" Provençal poetry, Arabic poetry contributed by contact with Provençal discourse to the formation and development of courtly lyricism in regards to both its form and theme, as well as its rhythm, rhyme scheme, internal division, and so on. The Russian academician Nikolai Konrad has demonstrated that the Arab world was in contact, on the other side of Islam, with the Orient and China (in 751, on the banks of the river Talas, the army of the Halfat of Bagdad met the army of the T'ang Empire). Two Chinese collections, "Yüeh-fu" and "Yü-t'ai hsii-yung," which date from the third and fourth centuries a.d., evoke the themes and organization of courtly Provençal poetry of the twelfth through the fifteenth centuries. Chinese songs, on the other hand, constitute a distinct series and stem from a different world of thought. Nonetheless, contact and contamination are a fact of these two cultures—the Arabic and the Chinese (Islamization of China, followed by infiltration of Chinese signifying structure [art and literature] into Arabic rhetoric and, consequently, into Mediterranean culture). See Nikolai Konrad, "Comparative Problems in Comparative Literature." In Izvěstíja Akademii nauk SSSR, "Literature and Language" series, 1959, fasc. 4, p. 335.

17. J. Coulet, Le Troubadour Guilhem Montagutal (Toulouse: Bibliothèque Meridionale, 1928), Series 12, IV.


21. See Le Mystère de Vieux Testament (fifteenth century), in which the officers of Nebuchadnezzar's army enumerate forty-three kinds of weapons; and Le Martyre de saint Cantien (late fifteenth century), in which the leader of the Roman troops enumerates forty-five weapons; and so on.


23. Concerning borrowings and plagiarisms by Antoine de La Sale, see M. Lecourt,

24. Following a period when books were considered as sacred objects (sacred book = Latin book), the late Middle Ages went through a period when books were devalorized, and this was accompanied by texts being replaced with imagery. “Beginning with the middle of the twelfth century, the role and fate of books changed. As the place of production and exchange, the city had undergone the impact of books and stimulated their appearance. Deeds and words had an echo in them and were multiplied in a proliferating dialectic. The book as a product of prime necessity entered into the cycle of Medieval production. It became a profitable and marketable product; but it also became a protected product.”

Albert Flocon, *L’Univers des Livres* (Paris: Hermann, 1961), p. 1. *Secular* books soon began to appear: the Roland cycle, courtly novels (the Novel of Alexander the Great, the Novel of the Thebes), Breton novels (King Arthur, the Grail), the Romance of the Rose, troubadour and trouvère poems, the poetry of Rutebeuf, fabliaux, the Roman de Renart, miracle plays, liturgical drama, etc. An actual *trade* in manuscript books sprang up and saw considerable expansion in the fifteenth century in Paris, Bruges, Ghent, Antwerp, Augsburg, Cologne, Strasbourg, Vienna. In markets and fairs, near the churches, paid copyists would spread out their offerings and hawk their wares. See Svend Dahl, *Histoire du livre de l’Antiquité à nos jours* (Paris: Poinat, 1960). The cult of books extended into the court of the kings of Anjou (who were closely linked to the Italian Renaissance) where Antoine de La Sale worked. René of Anjou (1480) owned twenty-four Turkish and Arabic manuscripts, and in his chamber there hung “a large panel on which were written the ABC’s with which one can write throughout all the Christian and Saracenian countries.”

25. It seems natural for Western thought to consider any writing as *secondary*, as coming after vocalization. This devalorization of writing harkens back to Plato, as many of our philosophical presuppositions: “There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on my teaching. For it does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge; but after much converse about the matter itself and a life lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and thereafter sustains itself.” (*The Platonie Epistles*, J. Harward, trans. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932], 7:135). Such is the case unless writing happens to be assimilated to an authority figure or to an immutable truth, unless it manages “to write what is of great service to mankind and to bring the nature of things into the light for all to see” (ibid.). But idealist reasoning sceptically discovers that “further, on account of the weakness of language [ ... ] no man of intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in language, especially not a language that is unchangeable, which is true of that which is set down in written characters” (ibid., pp. 136-37). Historians of writing generally agree with that thesis. See James G. Février, *Histoire de l’écriture* (Paris: Payot, 1948). On the other hand, some historians insist on writing’s preeminence over spoken language. See Chang Chen-ming, *L’Ecriture chinoise et le geste humain* (Paris: P. Geurhner, 1937) and I. Van Gineken, *La Reconstitution typologique des langages archaïques de l’humanité* (Amsterdam: Noorder-Hollandscbe uitgevers-maatschappij, 1939).


28. The poetry of troubadours, like popular tales, stories of voyages, and other kinds of narratives, often introduces at the end the speaker as a witness to or participant in the narrated “facts.” Yet, in novelistic conclusions, the author speaks not as a witness to some “event” (as in folk tales), not to express his “feelings” or his “art” (as in troubadour poetry); rather, he speaks in order to assume ownership of the discourse that he appeared at first to have given to someone else (a character). He envisions himself as the actor of speech (and not of a sequence of events), and he follows through the loss of that speech (its death), after all interest in the narrated events has ended (the death of the main character, for instance).
