Thalia R. Goldstein and Paul Bloom, ‘The Mind on Stage: Why Cognitive Scientists Should Study Acting’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15 (2011), 141-2.

Goldstein and Bloom think ‘it is now time for cognitive science to take the stage’. They see that have turned to science to understand their discipline better, and they want to return the compliment. This isn’t interdisciplinary reciprocation, though. They think the phenomenon of ‘realistic acting’ is worth investigation, and that it might help them aim for a better understanding of pretence, deception, and/or ‘social cognitive capacities, such as theory of mind or empathy’. What they don’t explicitly allow for is the possibility that writers, actors, directors and audiences might already have valuable insights into these very things.
      I am addressing a very brief essay, which is optimistic and open-minded about the project it proposes. I recognise that it would be a big step to expect a scientific psychological study to look to the world of the theatre for its knowledge about a topic, rather than for a chance to offer insights. However, it seems to me a small step to realise that writers, actors, and directors could all offer considerable expertise in how, for example, empathy works. Their success depends on a shrewd practical understanding of how we see things through others’ eyes.

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Furthermore, even in a constructive spirit I need to note some problems in the things that Goldstein and Bloom take for granted. ‘Realistic acting’ is seen as a new phenomenon; before the 20th century, ‘performance was highly stylized’. They also say that ‘it was not until Elizabethan England that characters had inner states portrayed onstage (via monologues directed to the audience)’. Of course, acting styles change, and I see what they are getting at here; I may need to rely on a similar degree of indulgence whenever I paraphrase developments in cognitive science.
      Nevertheless, I do think that they are relying on a narrow idea of ‘inner states’. In much earlier drama there are representations of anger, confusion, love, and so on, all of which are inner states within some definitions. What there aren’t necessarily are representations of mental processes as we have been taught to recognise them by modern novels, modern acting styles, and other rather specific contexts. I also don’t know what to do with intriguing that suggests most humans routinely attribute intentions (another kind of inner state) to moving shapes. Our social cognition appears to be very resourceful in finding ways to get below the surface.
      In addition, it does seem to me to matter that the notion of what is ‘realistic’ isn’t absolute. One of the priorities of Aristotle’s Poetics, describing the very beginnings of western drama, is consistency in representation (so, for example, a soldier character should not be scared of blood, and should speak like a soldier). What we see as stylized gestures in earlier British acting styles might have struck their audience as very effective ways of communicating convincing impressions and effects. The history of performance and the changing theory of drama over time could add a lot of sophistication to the use of the term ‘realistic’.
      As it stands, though, it’s a problem, as in an arresting claim from the very beginning of the article: ‘One of the main pleasures of contemporary life is the observation of realistic acting in dramatic theatre, television comedies, award-winning movies, and pornography.’ I don’t know what to make of this. The styles of acting that typify theatre, television, and cinema are all different, and within each medium there are further variations. The last item on the list seems a real stretch. As far as I know, pornography has no reputation for realistic acting, only for the unflinching representation of something other media would not. It seems to be better known for bad acting and for extremely unrealistic scenarios.

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It is better to end by welcoming willingness from cognitive scientists to engage with the theatre as an environment in which to learn about cognition. It will obviously take some work to make the case that the intricacies of literary and theatrical terminology and practice should be part of this exploration. Likewise, it will not be simple to make the case that pertinent knowledge is already to be found in plays and performances. That’s something in which this blog hopes to participate.